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Abstract
In the late sixties the Canadian psychologist Laurence J. Peter advanced an appar-
ently paradoxical principle, named since then after him, which can be summarized
as follows: ’Every new member in a hierarchical organization climbs the hierarchy
until he/she reaches his/her level of maximum incompetence’. Despite its apparent
unreasonableness, such a principle would realistically act in any organization where
the mechanism of promotion rewards the best members and where the mechanism
at their new level in the hierarchical structure does not depend on the competence
they had at the previous level, usually because the tasks of the levels are very dif-
ferent to each other. Here we show, by means of agent based simulations, that if
the latter two features actually hold in a given model of an organization with a
hierarchical structure, then not only is the Peter principle unavoidable, but also
it yields in turn a significant reduction of the global efficiency of the organization.
Within a game theory-like approach, we explore different promotion strategies and
we find, counterintuitively, that in order to avoid such an effect the best ways for
improving the efficiency of a given organization are either to promote each time an
agent at random or to promote randomly the best and the worst members in terms
of competence.
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1 Introduction: The Peter Principle
The efficiency of an organization in terms of improving the ability to perform
a job minimizing the respective costs is a key concept in several fields like eco-
nomics [1] and game theory [2]. But it could also be very important in ecology
to understand the behaviour of social insects [3], in computer science when
you have to allocate different tasks to a cluster of computers having different
performances [4] or in science policy concerning how individual tasks are dis-
tributed among the thousands of members of a big collaboration, like those
working for example at a large collider. Common sense has always been widely
used in any hierarchical organization to manage the system of promotions: it
tells us that a member who is competent at a given level, will be competent
also at an higher level of the hierarchy, so it seems a good deal, as well as a
meritorious action, to promote such a member to the next level in order to
ensure the global efficiency of the system. The problem is that common sense,
in many areas of our everyday life, often deceives us. In 1969 the Canadian
psychologist Laurence J. Peter warned that the latter statement could be true
also for the promotions management in a hierarchical organization [5].
Actually, the simple observation that a new position in the organization re-
quires different work skills for effectively performing the new task (often com-
pletely different from the previous one), could suggest that the competence of
a member at the new level could not be correlated to that at the old one. Peter
speculated that we may consider this new degree of competence as a random
variable, even taking into account any updating course the organization could
require before the promotion: this is what we call the Peter hypothesis. If
the Peter hypothesis holds, and if one promotes each time the most compe-
tent member at the involved level, it could turn out a paradoxical process for
which competent members will climb up the hierarchical ladder indefinitely,
until they reach a position where they will be no longer competent and there-
fore no longer promoted. This is the so called Peter principle, whose long term
consequence seems to imply an unavoidable spreading of the incompetence
over all of the organization and would be in danger of causing a collapse in
its efficiency, as also confirmed already in 1970 by a mathematical analysis of
J.Kane [6].
More recently several reflections on bureaucratic inefficiency have been car-
ried out in the context of social science, politics and business management
[7,8,9,10,11,12], some of which were directly inspired by the Peter principle
and with the purpose of circumvent its adverse effects. However, as far as we
know, we still lack a computational study that not only would reproduce the
Peter principle dynamics, but also would allow, in particular, the exploration
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Fig. 1. Schematic view of a hierarchical pyramidal organization. We consider here
an organization with 160 positions divided into six levels. Each level has a different
number of members (which decreases climbing the hierarchy) with a different re-
sponsibility, i.e. with a different weight on the global efficiency of the organization,
reported on the left side. The member colour indicates the degree of competence,
which at the beginning is normally distributed with average 7.0 and variance 2.0.
Empty positions are in yellow (see the text).
of alternative strategies in order to find the best way for improving the effi-
ciency of a given organization [13].
In the last few years the help of hard sciences, like physics and mathemat-
ics, has been frequently advocated in order to get a more quantitative under-
standing of social sciences mechanisms [14,15,16,17]. It is now largely accepted
that simple models and simulations inspired by statistical physics are able to
take into account collective behaviour of large groups of individuals, discover-
ing emergent features independent of their individual psychological attributes
and very often counterintuitive and difficult to predict following common sense
[18,19,20]. Along these lines, by means of an agent based simulation approach
[21,22,23], here we study the Peter principle process within a general con-
text where different promotions strategies compete one with one another for
maximizing the global efficiency of a given hierarchical system.
2 Dynamical Rules of the Model
In order to simplify the problem, we chose for our study a prototypical pyra-
midal organization, (see Fig.1), made up of a total of 160 positions distributed
over six levels numbered from 6 (the bottom level) to 1 (the top one), with 81
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members (agents) in level 6, 41 in level 5, 21 in level 4, 11 in level 3, 5 in level
2 and 1 in level 1. We verified that the numerical results that we found for
such an organization are very robust and show only a little dependence on the
number of levels or on the number of agents per level (as long as it decreases
going from the bottom to the top). Each agent is characterized only by an
age and by a degree of competence. The degree of competence, which includes
all the features (efficiency, productivity, care, diligence, ability to acquire new
skills) characterizing the average performance of an agent in a given position
at a given level, etc., is a real variable with values ranging from 1 to 10 and is
graphically represented with a colour scale with increasing intensity. The age,
however, is an integer variable included in the range 18-60, which increases by
one unit per each time step.
The snapshot reported in Fig.1 shows, as an example, a given realization of the
initial conditions, where both the competence and the age of each agent have
been selected randomly inside two appropriate normal distributions with, re-
spectively, means 7.0 and 25 and standard deviations 2.0 and 5. At each time
step all the agents with a competence under a fixed dismissal-threshold or
with an age over a fixed retirement-threshold leave the organization and their
positions become empty, while their colour becomes yellow (the dismissal-
threshold is arbitrarily fixed to 4 and the retirement-threshold to an age of
60). Simultaneously, any empty position at a given level is filled by promot-
ing one member from the level immediately below, going down progressively
from the top of the hierarchy until the bottom level has been reached. Finally,
empty positions at the bottom level are filled with the recruitment of new
members with the same normal distribution of competences described before.
We consider two possible mechanisms of transmission of competence of an
agent from one level to the next one: the common sense hypothesis, where a
member inherits his/her old competence in his/her new position with a small
random variation δ (where δ can assume random values included within ±10%
of the maximum value in the competence scale, i.e. δ ∈ [−1, 1]), and the Peter
hypothesis, where the new competence of every agent is independent of the old
one and is assigned randomly (again with the same normal distribution than
before). For each one of these two cases we take into account three different
ways of choosing the agent to promote at the next level: the most competent
(The Best strategy, suggested by common sense and adopted also in the Peter
principle), the least competent (The Worst strategy) or one agent at random
(the Random strategy).
At this point, in order to evaluate the global performance of the organiza-
tion, we introduce a parameter, called global efficiency, which is calculated
by summing the competences of the members level by level, multiplied by a
level-dependent factor of responsibility (ri, with i = 1, 2,..., 6) ranging from
0 to 1 and increasing on climbing the hierarchy (such a factor, shown in the
left side of Fig.1, takes into account the weights that the performances of the
agents of different levels have in the global efficiency of the organization). Fi-
nally, the result is normalized to its maximum possible value (Max(E)) and
4
0 200 400 600 800 1000
time
58
60
62
64
66
68
70
72
74
76
78
80
82
84
Av
er
ag
e 
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
(%
)
Common Sense: The_Best  (δ=1)
Common Sense: Random (δ=1)
Common Sense: The_Worst  (δ=1)
Peter Hypothesis: The_Best  
Peter Hypothesis: The_Worst  
Peter Hypothesis: Random 
Averages over 50 events
Averaged Initial Efficiency
Fig. 2. Efficiency time evolution for different strategies. This figure shows the time
evolution of the global efficiency averaged over 50 realizations of the initial com-
petence distribution (events). Starting from the same initial average value (dashed
line), the efficiency is plotted for 1000 time steps for the six combinations of the CS
and PH mechanisms with the three different promotion strategies (The Best, The
Worst and Random).
to the total number of agents (N), so that the global efficiency (E) can be
expressed as a percentage. Therefore, if Ci is the total competence of level
i, the resulting expression for the efficiency is E(%) =
∑
6
i=1
Ciri
Max(E)·N
· 100, where
Max(E) =
∑6
i=1 10 · niri/N (being ni the number of agents of level i).
3 Strategies in Competition: Simulations Results
We realized all the simulations presented in the paper with NetLogo [23], a
programmable environment designed for developing agent based simulations
of complex systems. In Fig.2 we show the time evolution of the global efficiency
considering the six possible combinations among the mechanisms of compe-
tence transmission and the promotion strategies. The evolution is calculated
for 1000 time steps, a duration long enough to reach a stationary (on average)
asymptotic value, and is further averaged over 50 different realizations of the
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Fig. 3. Efficiency for alternating strategies. The plot shows the asymptotic values of
global efficiency averaged over the last 400 time steps and over 50 events in the case
of an alternating Best-Worst strategy of promotions, as a function of the percentage
p of promotions of the best members with respect to all the promotions and for both
the CS and PH mechanisms of competence transmission. In correspondence with
the values p=0.0 and p=1.0 (respectively The Worst and The Best strategies) one
recovers the asymptotic values of the previous figure for both scenarios. The point
[0.47,71] (green square) gives the most convenient strategy to adopt if one does not
know which mechanism of competence transmission is operative in the organization.
initial conditions. The corresponding standard deviations are ∼ 1% and are
not reported. The simulations start always from the same 50 initial configu-
rations of competences, so the initial average efficiency is fixed at the value
69.68% (dashed line). At t=0 all the curves seem to start from a point slightly
above this line because the initial random distribution of competences pro-
duces many empty positions which are immediately filled in the first few steps
then producing, regardless of the other parameters, a sudden small initial in-
crement of about 2% in the global average efficiency. We verified that all the
results presented do not depend drastically on small changes in the value of
the free parameters: therefore the emerging scenario and the corresponding
conclusions appear very robust.
Looking at Fig.2 it is clearly apparent that if one always promotes the best
member, as is usually done by all real organizations, the asymptotic value of
the average efficiency (AE) significantly increases (+9%) with respect to the
initial efficiency only if common sense (CS) transmission occurs: if, on the
contrary, one assumes as valid the Peter hypothesis (PH), a significant decre-
ment of AE occurs (−10%) as intuitively predicted by Peter. Since in general
it is difficult to know which mechanism is actually operative in a given real
organization, that of promoting the best member does not turn out to always
be a winning strategy! Let us consider the opposite strategy, i.e. promoting
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The Best The Worst Random Best-Worst (p=0.47)
Common Sense +9% −5% +2% +1.5%
Peter Hypothesys −10% 12% +1% +1.5%
Table 1
Comparison of gains and losses for all the strategies adopted.The table summarizes
the average gain and loss percentage calculated with respect to the average initial
efficiency by following the different promotion strategies. The table indicates that
The Best and The Worst strategies provide at the same time significant gains and
consistent losses, depending on the mechanisms of competence transmission at stake
(common sense or the Peter hypothesis); therefore the best strategies to adopt when
such a mechanism is unknown are clearly the Random and the alternating Best-
Worst ones (the latter, for p = 0.47, gives also exactly the same positive gain for
the two scenarios).
the worst member. Again the resulting AE strictly depends on the transmis-
sion mechanism, but in the opposite way: in fact, in this case the strategy is
a winning one for PH (+12%), while it is a losing one for CS (−5%). Finally,
the third strategy that of promoting one agent at random gives more simi-
lar results in both cases, although the improvement of the initial efficiency is
limited (+2% for CS, +1% for PH).
In order to obtain exactly the same efficiency for CS and PH, in Fig.3 we
introduce a fourth Best-Worst strategy, where the best and the worst agents
are chosen alternately with a variable percentage p. For p = 0 and p = 1 we
recover respectively The Worst and The Best cases shown in Fig.2, while for
values p ∈]0, 1[ all the intermediate situations between these limiting two cases
are obtained. Interpolating the numerical results for the CS and PH scenarios,
we found that an alternating strategy with an almost random choice between
the best and the worst members (p = 0.47; see the green square) produces on
average the same asymptotic value of global efficiency in the two cases, with
a limited gain (+1.5%) but without losses.
We summarize in Table 1 the percentages of gain or loss obtained for the dif-
ferent strategies applied. These results confirm that, within a game theory-like
approach, if one does not know what mechanism of competence transmission
is operative in a given organization, the best promotion strategy seems to
be that of choosing a member at random or, at least, that of choosing al-
ternately, in a random sequence, the best or the worst members. This result
is quite unexpected and counterintuitive, since the common sense tendency
would be that of always promoting the best member, a choice that, if the
Peter hypothesis holds, turns out to be completely wrong. On the other hand,
by applying one of the two strategies Random and Best-Worst, losses can be
successfully avoided without any further (possibly expensive) precaution of
the organization’s managers (such as specialization or updating courses).
Finally, in Fig.3 we quantitatively verified the apparently surprising state-
ment of the Peter principle, i.e. the fact that each member in a hierarchical
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Fig. 4. Career evolutions. We show in the figure the behaviour of the competence
per level calculated while each agent climbs the hierarchy for the six different cases
of Fig. 2. It is the computational verification of the Peter statement: ’Everynew
member in a hierarchical organization climbs the hierarchy until he/she reaches
his/her level of maximum incompetence’. Each point is an average over all the
agents who, in a single event, go up from the sixth, bottom level to one of the upper
levels. As expected, the Peter effect clearly appears only in the PH cases with the
strategy of promoting the best agent (full black circles). Furthermore it does not
depend on the number of levels that the agents cross in their careers.
organization climbs the hierarchy until he/she reaches the level where his/her
competence is minimal. We found that no matter how many levels an agent
crosses in his/her career: if one adopts the strategy of promoting the best
member and if the PH holds, then all the members will end their career at
the level where their competence is minimal or, what is the same, where their
incompetence is the greatest. Therefore Peters intuition is definitively cor-
rect: this dangerous mixture yields the rapid decrease of efficiency observed in
Fig.2. It is interesting to notice that if instead the PH is combined with the
strategy of promoting the worst member, then the situation is diametrically
opposite, i.e. each agent climbs the hierarchy until he/she reaches the level
where his/her competence is at the maximum. Finally, the other PH lines in
Fig.3, corresponding to the random promotion strategy, show constant com-
petences during all the careers, and the same happens in the analogous case
with the CS mechanism.
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4 Conclusions
In conclusion, our computational study of the Peter principle process applied
to a prototypical organization with pyramidal hierarchical structure shows
that the strategy of promoting the best members in the PH case induces a
rapid decrease of efficiency, while it works well only if members would ide-
ally maintain their competence at each level, an hypothesis that, although in
agreement with common sense, seems in practice very unrealistic in the major-
ity of the real situations. On the other hand we obtained the counterintuitive
result that the best strategies for improving, or at least for not diminishing,
the efficiency of an organization, when one ignores the actual mechanism of
competence transmission, are those of promoting an agent at random or of
randomly alternating the promotion of the best and the worst members. We
think that these results could be useful to guide the management of large real
hierarchical systems of different natures and in different fields [24].
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